Is There a Due Process Protected Right to Police Enforcement of a Domestic Abuse Restraining Order? by Grenig, Jay E.
Marquette University Law School
Marquette Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2005
Is There a Due Process Protected Right to Police
Enforcement of a Domestic Abuse Restraining
Order?
Jay E. Grenig
Marquette University Law School, jay.grenig@marquette.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub
Part of the Law Commons
Publication Information
Jay E. Grenig, Is There a Due Process Protected Right to Police Enforcement of a Domestic Abuse
Restraining Order?, 2004-05 Term Preview U.S. Sup. Ct. Cas. 326 (2005). © 2005 American Bar
Association. This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form
or by any means or downloaded or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the
express written consent of the American Bar Association.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Grenig, Jay E., "Is There a Due Process Protected Right to Police Enforcement of a Domestic Abuse Restraining Order?" (2005).
Faculty Publications. Paper 432.
http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub/432
MUNIC IPAL LIABILITY
.s, C . Is There a Due Process Protected
Right to Police Enforcement of a
Domestic Abuse Restraining Order?
by Jry E. Grentig
,- m ,', I'REIEUV,' United States Suprcmc C,urt (uscs., pagcs 326-3301 @ 2005 American Bar Association.
In June 1999. the
estranged husband of
Jessica Gonzales abduct-
ed their three daughters.
When Ms. Gonzales
contacted the Castle
Rock (Colorado) Police
Department to ask it to
enforce a restraining
order against her hus-
band, she was told there
was nothing the depart-
ment could do. Early the
next morning, Mr.
Gonzales was shot dead
after he fired on the
Castle Rock police sta-
tion with a semiautomat-
ic weapon. The bodies of
the three ,irls. who had
been murdered by Mr.
Gonzales the previous
evening, were found in
the cab of his truck.
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ISSUE
Does a court-issued domestic abuse
restraining order, whose enforce-
ment is mandated by a statute, cre-
ate a property interest protected by
the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment?
FACTS
On May 21, 1999, Ms. Gonzales
obtained a temporar, restraining
order limiting her husband's ability
to have contact with her and their
daughters, aged 10, nine and seven.
The restraining order commanded
in part that Mr. Gonzales "not
molest or disturb the peace of [MNls.
Gonzales] or ... any child." The
restraining order further stated "the
court ... finds that physical or emo-
tional harm would result if you are
not excluded from the family home"
and directed Mr. Gonzales to stay at
least 1O( yards away from the prop-
crtv at all times. Neither parent nor
the daughters could unilaterally
change the terms of the order
because it explicitly stated:
Jay E. Grenig is a professor of law
at Marquette University Law
School in Milwaukcc, Wis., and a
co-author of West's Federal Jury
Practice and Instructions (5th edi-
tion). He can be reached
at jgrenig@earthlink.net
or (414) 288-5377.
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IF YOU VIOLATE THIS ORDER
THINKING THAT THE OTHER
PARTY OR A CHILD NAMED IN
THIS ORDER HAS GIVEN YOU
PERMISSION, YOU ARE
WRONG, AND CAN BE ARREST-
ED AND PROSECUTED. THE
TERMS OF THIS ORDER CAN-
NOT BE CHANGED BY AGREE-
MENT OF THE OTHER PARTY
OR THE CItLD(REN). ONLY
THE COURT CAN CHANGE
THIS ORDER.
The order directed law enforcement
officials to "use every reasonable
means to enforce" the restraining
order and required them to arrest
or, where impractical, seek an arrest
warrant for those who violate the
restraining order. The order also
instructed law enforcement officials
to take the restrained person to the
nearest jail or detention facility.
After the trial court issued the tem-
porary restraining order, the order
was entered into the state's central
registry for protective orders, which
is accessible to all state and local
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law enforcement agencies. On June
4, 1999, the order was made perma-
nent. The permanent order allowed
Mr. Gonzales to collect the girls
from Ms. Gonzales's home for
parental time.
Early in the evening of June 22,
1999, Mr. Gonzales abducted the
girls while they were playing outside
their home. Mr. Gonzales had not
given Ms. Gonzales advance notice
of his interest in spending time with
his daughters on that Tuesday night,
and the two had not previously
agreed upon a midweek visit. When
Ms. Gonzales realized her daughters
were missing, she suspected that Mr.
Gonzales, who had a history of
erratic behavior and suicidal
threats, had taken them. At approxi-
mately 7:30 P.M., she made her first
phone call to the Castle Rock Police
Department requesting assistance in
enforcing the restraining order
against her husband. Two officers
were sent to her home. When they
arrived, she showed them a copy of
the restraining order and asked that
it be enforced and her children
returned to her immediately. The
police officers told her there was
nothing they could do about the
order and suggested that Ms.
Gonzales call the Police Department
again if the children did not return
home by 10:00 P.m.
About an hour later, Ms. Gonzales
spoke to Mr. Gonzales on his cellu-
lar telephone, and he told her he
was with the girls at an amusement
park in Denver. Ms. Gonzales imme-
diately made a second call to the
Castle Rock Police Department,
requesting the police find and arrest
Mr. Gonzales. The police officer
refused to do so and suggested Ms.
Gonzales wait until 10:00 P.M. to see
if the girls returned home. Shortly
after 10:00 P.M., Ms. Gonzales called
the Police Department and reported
to the dispatcher that her daughters
had yet to be returned home by
their father. She was told to wait
for another two hours. At midnight,
she called the Police Department
again and informed the dispatcher
her daughters were still missing.
Ms. Gonzales then went to Mr.
Gonzales's apartment and found no
one at home. Ms. Gonzales called
the Police Department a fifth time,
and the dispatcher advised her to
wait at the apartment until the
police arrived. No officers ever came
to the apartment.
At 12:50 A.M., Ms. Gonzales went to
the Castle Rock police station,
where she met with a police officer.
The officer took an incident report
from Ms. Gonzales, but he made no
further effort to enforce the
restraining order.
At approximately 3:20 A.M., Mr.
Gonzales drove up to the Castle
Rock police station. He got out of
his truck and began shooting at the
station with a semiautomatic hand-
gun. Mr. Gonzales was shot dead.
The police found the bodies of the
three girls, who had been murdered
by their father earlier that evening,
in the cab of the truck.
Ms. Gonzales sued Castle Rock and
three of its police officers on behalf
of herself and her three daughters in
the U.S. District Court for the
District of Colorado. She sought $30
million in compensatory damages as
well as punitive damages and attor-
ney fees. Relying on 42 U.S.C. §
1983, Ms. Gonzales claimed her due
process rights had been violated by
the officers' failure to enforce the
restraining order against her hus-
band. Ms. Gonzales also alleged that
the town maintained a custom and
policy of failing to respond properly
to complaints of domestic restrain-
ing order violations and tolerated
the nonenforcement of such protec-
tive orders by police officers, result-
ing in the reckless disregard of a
person's right to police protection
granted by such orders. A Colorado
statute requires police to arrest
restrained persons who are in viola-
tion of a restraining order.
The city and the police officers filed
a petition for rehearing by all the
judges in the Tenth Circuit, seeking
review of the panel's conclusion that
Ms. Gonzales had stated a procedur-
al due process claim. The Tenth
Circuit granted the petition and
asked the parties to address
whether Colorado law in combina-
tion with the restraining order cre-
ated a property interest entitled to
due process protection, and, if so,
what process was due.
Reversing the trial court, a divided
Tenth Circuit held that Ms. Gonzales
had a due-process protected right to
police enforcement of the domestic
abuse restraining order. Gonzales v.
City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093
(10th Cir. 2004) (en banc). The
court explained that when a court
order commands the grant of a gov-
ernment benefit or service through
the use of mandatory language and a
state statute limits the discretion of
official decision makers, a due-
process protected property interest
exists. The court ruled that Ms.
Gonzales therefore had a due-
process protected right to police
enforcement of the restraining order,
which specifically directed, with
only the narrowest of exceptions,
that Mr. Gonzales stay away from
Ms. Gonzales and their three daugh-
ters. The court pointed out that the
restraining order provided objective
predicates that, when present, man-
dated enforcement of its terms and
that the Colorado statutory scheme
indicates that the state fully intend-
ed the recipient of a domestic-abuse
restraining order to have an entitle-
ment to its enforcement.
However, the court also held that
Ms. Gonzales did not have a "sub-
(Continued on Page 328)
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stantive due process" right to police
protection against harm from her
husband. The court further held
that the police officers were entitled
to qualified immunity, and the
city was not entitled to qualified
immunity.
The Supreme Court granted Castle
Rock's petition for a writ of certio-
rari.125 S.Ct. 417 (2004).
CASE ANALYSIS
When a due process claim is
premised on a deprivation of a prop-
erty right, the court first must
define the precise nature of the
property threatened by state action.
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248
(1983). In DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social
Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989), the
Supreme Court held that a county
had no constitutional duty to pro-
tect a child from the child's father
after the county received reports of
possible abuse. The Court declared
that the purpose of the Due Process
Clause was to protect people from
the state, not to ensure that the
state protected them from one
another. The Court ruled that the
county's failure to protect an indi-
vidual against private violence does
not constitute a violation of the Due
Process Clause.
Castle Rock argues that the proce-
dural due process claim allowed by
the Tenth Circuit is not sanctioned
by, and would effectively overrule,
DeShancev. Castle Rock warns that
the Supreme Court should be wary
of ever recognizing a nontraditional
type property interest in police
enforcement procedures that could
result in claims of procedural failure
being raised every time the police
are unsuccessful in protecting
against private-party violence.
Castle Rock states that the "nature"
of the interest asserted by Ms.
Gonzales is simply not within the
contemplation of the "liberty" or
"property" protected by the Due
Process Clause. According to Castle
Rock, Ms. Gonzales's complaint is
not really about any lack of process
(Castle Rock says she actually had
the opportunity to be heard on sev-
eral occasions) but about the police
department's alleged failure to
respond to her requests in the way
she would have liked. Castle Rock
claims the alleged procedural failing
derives only from the lack of a
favorable result, and the only cura-
tive procedural remedy would pre-
sumably be one that guaranteed Ms.
Gonzales a different result. Castle
Rock says this is a substantive due
process claim challenging the out-
come, not a procedural due process
claim concerned about the kind of
hearing provided.
Ms. Gonzales disagrees, declaring
that the Tenth Circuit's decision
does not conflict with DeShaney.
Ms. Gonzales reasons that
DeShancy limited its constitutional
review to whether a substantive due
process right to government protec-
tion exists in the abstract and
specifically did not decide whether
a state might afford its citizens an
"'entitlement" to receive protective
services in accordance with the
terms of a court order and state
statute, which would enjoy proce-
dural due process protection against
state action.
Ms. Gonzales points out that the
Supreme Court is not being asked to
address whether she had a substan-
tive right to receive government
protection that could not be denied
without reasonable justification in
the service of a legitimate govern-
ment object. Rather, Ms. Gonzales
says the Court must determine
whether Colorado created for her an
entitlement that cannot be taken
away from her without procedural
due process, and, if so, whether
Castle Rock's arbitrary denial of
that entitlement was procedurally
unfair under the well-pleaded facts
of her complaint.
According to Ms. Gonzales, due to
the city's "policy and custom" of
failing to respond properly to com-
plaints of restraining order viola-
tions, she was denied the process
laid out in the statute. Ms. Gonzales
alleges that the police did not con-
sider her request in a timely fashion
but repeatedly required her to call
the station over several hours. Ms.
Gonzales argues that the Colorado
statute promised a process by which
her restraining order would be given
vitality through careful and prompt
consideration of an enforcement
request, and the Constitution
requires no less. Ms. Gonzales says
that the police never engaged in a
bona fide consideration of whether
there was probable cause to enforce
the restraining order.
It is the position of Castle Rock that
affording procedural due process
requirements before state officials
fail to protect against private-party
violence would be utterly impracti-
cal. It says that finding Ms. Gonzales
was entitled to procedural due
process opens a hornets' nest of
issues with respect to the kind of
process that would be required.
Ms. Gonzales responds that the due
process to which Ms. Gonzales is
entitled is simple and practical. She
explains that the process set up in
Colorado's statutory scheme was
that the police must, in a timely
fashion, consider the merits of any
request to enforce a restraining
order and if such a consideration
reveals probable cause, the police
must enforce the order. Ms.
Gonzales concludes that the Tenth
Circuit's opinion must be read
as reflecting a very narrow, fact-
specific issue.
According to Castle Rock, Colorado
law did not, and the federal courts
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therefore cannot, create a property
interest in the enforcement of
restraining orders. Castle Rock
explains that Colorado has simply
established directory procedures for
the enforcement of restraining
orders. Even if "shall" is read as
mandatory, Castle Rock says that
Colorado has simply mandated
enforcement procedures; it has not
created a property interest either
in ongoing police protection or in
enforcement according to those
procedures.
Ms. Gonzales asserts that the terms
of the restraining order and
Colorado's statutory enforcement
scheme created an entitlement to
police enforcement of the restrain-
ing order. She argues that the
mandatory enforcement terms of
the order are not inconsistent with
police discretion. Ms. Gonzales says
that not only did the restraining
order clearly evince the state's
intent that its terms be enforced by
the police, but the Colorado statuto-
ry scheme demonstrates its intent
to require the enforcement of
domestic abuse restraining orders.
SIGNIFICANCE
The Tenth Circuit's decision in
Gonzales is the only reported cir-
cuit court decision addressing the
issues presented in this appeal. Two
reported district cases have done so.
In both cases, the district court
found that the issuance of a
restraining order gave the holder of
the restraining order a procedural
due process right to "reasonable
protection" or a -reasoned police
response." Coffiman v. Wilson Police
Dept. 739 F.Supp. 257 (E.D.
Pa.1990) (properly served domestic
abuse protective order created con-
stitutionally protected property
interest in police enforcement);
Siddle v. City of Cambridge, 761
F.Supp. 503 (S.D. Ohio 1991)
(although domestic abuse protective
order created a property interest
protected by procedural due
process, there was no due process
violation in manner in which police
responded to woman's complaints).
In another case decided after
Gonzales, a three-judge panel of the
Tenth Circuit held that an allegation
that police officers violated a female
student's rights by failing to investi-
gate adequately her alleged rape by
members of the state university
football team and discouraging her
from pursuing prosecutions did not
state a claim for violation of the
plaintiff's procedural due process
rights. Jennings v. City qf
Stillwater, 383 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir.
2004). The Jennings court distin-
guished Gonzales on the ground
that the property interest in
Gonzales was the product of a
court-issued restraining order, cou-
pled with statutory language requir-
ing enforcement. On the other
hand, the court found that the claim
in Jennings rested solely on the lan-
guage of an Oklahoma statute
requiring law enforcement officers
not to discourage prosecution of a
sexual harassment claim.
Castle Rock urges that if the Tenth
Circuit's rule is adopted by the
Supreme Court, every substantive
due process claim could simply be
recast as a procedural due process
claim, severely undermining
DeShanev. Castle Rock concludes
that expanding constitutional liabili-
ty would open the door to thousands,
if not millions, of claims, supplanting
state tort law and imposing crushing
levels of liability on state and local
government. Castle Rock claims that
ratification of the Tenth Circuit's
decision would convert hundreds of
state procedural mandates into con-
stitutional claims, abolishing as a
matter of federal constitutional law
the discretion traditionally afforded
law enforcement officials, even when
the states themselves have dis-
avowed liability remedies.
Castle Rock says that the expansion
in both liability and litigation will
have devastating consequences both
for the public safety and for munici-
pal governments throughout the
United States. It argues that every
telephone call received by a police
dispatcher alleging a violation of a
restraining order containing the
word "shall" would have to be given
the highest priority and afforded
federally imposed procedures in
order to avoid constitutional liabili-
ty, no matter how urgent or severe
other matters may be.
On the other hand, however, Ms.
Gonzales declares that the restrain-
ing order, containing mandatory
language and specific objective cri-
teria curtailing the decision-making
discretion of police officers, clearly
commanded that the domestic
abuse restraining order be enforced.
For the Supreme Court to hold oth-
erwise, Ms. Gonzales states, would
render domestic abuse restraining
orders utterly valueless and law
enforcement agencies completely
unaccountable to the legislative or
judicial branches of government.
ATTORNEYS FOR THE
PARTIES
For Castle Rock, Colorado (Eric M.
Ziporin (303) 320-0509)
For Jessica Gonzales et al. (Brian J.
Reichel (303) 465-9034)
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In Support of Castle Rock,
Colorado
Denver Police Protective
Association et al. (David J. Bruno
(303) 831-1099)
International Municipal Lawyers
Association et al. (Brad D. Bailey
(303) 795-3725)
United States (Paul D. Clement,
Acting Solicitor General (202) 514-
2217)
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In Support of Jessica Gonzales
et al.
AARP (Stuart R. Cohen (202)
434-2060)
ACLU et al. (Caroline M. Brown
(202) 662-6000)
Family Violence Prevention Fund
et al. (Janine A. Carlan (202) 857-
6000)
International Law Scholars et al.
(Jennifer K. Brown (212) 925-6635)
Peggy Kerns et al. (David G. Hall
(956) 968-6574)
National Association of Women
Lawyers et al. (Lorelie S. Masters
(202) 639-6000)
National Black Police Association
et al. (Richard W. Smith (202) 756-
8000)
National Coalition Against
Domestic Violence et al. (Naomi
G. Beer (303) 572-6500)
National Network to End
Domestic Violence et al. (Fernando
R. Laguarda (202) 434-7300)
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